Clinical Engineering by Pietro, Derrico et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
8 
Clinical Engineering 
Pietro Derrico, Matteo Ritrovato,  
Federico Nocchi, Francesco Faggiano,  
Carlo Capussotto, Tiziana Franchin and Liliana De Vivo 
IRCCS Ospedale Pediatrico Bambino Gesù, Rome, 
 Italy 
1. Introduction 
Clinical Engineering (CE) represents the part of Biomedical Engineering focused on the 
applications of theories and methodologies of the broad biomedical engineering field to 
improve the quality of health services. Its activities especially concern the appropriate 
management of biomedical technologies (from purchasing to risk controlling) and the 
development and the adjustment of hospital informative systems and telemedicine 
networks. CE combines with the medicine knowledge for conducing of healthcare activities 
by providing expertise in a wide spectrum of topics, from human physiology and 
biomechanics to electronics and computer science. 
As biomedical technology developed towards ever more complex systems and spread in 
every clinical practice, so the field of CE grew. Such growth has been accompanied by an 
analogous expansion of biomedical and clinical engineering studies at the University and 
development of skills and tasks of CE professionals. 
The main aim of CE is to support the use of biomedical technology by health professionals 
and hospital organizations with appropriate skills in order to reach the best compromise 
between clinical efficacy/efficiency, patient and operators safety, care quality and 
innovation, and management and equipment costs. 
CE techniques and methodologies are mainly focused on safe, appropriate and economical 
management of technologies, as well as on governance and management (limited to specific 
responsibilities) of healthcare facility. Thus, CE covers all those knowledge and methods 
applied to the management of biomedical technologies, ranging from their early evaluation 
and assessment, to their technical conduct, to their dismissing. Thus the chapter will 
highlight different aspects of technology management by exploring technical and/or 
clinical, and/or economic issues related to the individuation and acquisition of appropriate 
equipment (i.e., Health Technology Assessment), acceptance testing, management of 
preventive and corrective maintenance, risk management, planning of quality testing, ICT 
management, management of maintenance contracts, equipments replacement planning, 
and so on. 
2. Healthcare risk management 
Because of the strong pressure on the health structures to optimize the services provided 
while lowering the associated costs and reducing the likelihood of adverse events, an 
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organizational approach, in which a Healthcare Risk Management program plays a central 
role, becomes important.  
Mistakes can be minimized, in fact, by creating organizational systems and using 
technologies to make it easier to do the right thing. It is clear that patient safety can be 
increased by means of appropriate procedures aimed at avoiding possible mistakes or 
correcting those that do happen.  
In particular, the potential for biomedical equipment related adverse events needs to be 
analyzed in order to prevent their occurrence: healthcare structures have to use systematic 
analytical methods and instruments to manage technological risks to both patients and 
operators.  
The aim of the health organizations is to take care of patients, by providing effective, 
appropriate and, in particular, safe treatments. The healthcare institutions (such as the 
clinicians themselves) have to ensure the care, as adequate as possible, of patients, avoiding 
or at least containing damage caused by human and system errors. Healthcare service 
activities connote, in fact, with the presence of several hazards that have the potential to 
harm patients and health operators. 
Currently the best known approach is the Healthcare Risk Management program, with 
which it is possible to identify, assess, mitigate and control healthcare facilities risks, and 
thus realize the concept of “systemic safety”. 
Originally such approaches focused mainly, if not entirely, on the problem of reducing the 
“Clinical Risk” (Clinical Risk Management, CRM)  with the aim of limiting enterprise 
liability-costs. In fact, over the course of the last several years healthcare institutions and 
practitioners have experienced a "malpractice crisis" that has led to the increase in jury 
verdicts, settlement amounts and insurance premiums, as well as dwindling insurance 
availability due to carrier withdrawals from the medical malpractice market (McCaffrey & 
Hagg-Rickert, 2010), and consequent increase of risk retention cost. 
Gradually, the focus shifted to clinical problems and thus the term CRM now encompasses 
strategies to reduce the incidence and magnitude of harm and improve the quality of care 
(Taylor-Adams, et al., 1999)  by focusing on patient safety and patient care related issues, 
including information gathering systems, loss control efforts, professional liability, risk 
financing and claims management activities.  
2.1 Technological risk management 
Dealing with clinical risk and patient safety means also dealing with biomedical 
technologies. In fact, as medical treatments have greatly progressed along with the 
analogous technological advances in medical equipment (ME), all medical procedures 
depend, to some extent, on technology to achieve their goals. Despite the (presupposed) 
inherent safety of MEs (also guaranteed by a plethora of laws and technical standards), 
device-related adverse events occur every day in hospitals around the world. Some can be 
very dangerous and occasionally even deadly.  
An adverse event is (as defined by Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, 
MHRA) “an event that causes, or has the potential to cause, unexpected or unwanted effects 
involving the safety of device users (including patients) or other persons”.  ME related adverse 
events can occur for several reasons, ranging from incorrect choice and acquisition of the 
device, wrong installation, and poor maintenance, to use error and device obsolescence. 
As stated before, a systemic approach is needed. Such an approach, identified as Medical 
Equipments Risk Management (MERM), is part of the global Technology Management 
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(Wilkins & Holley, 1998) as practised by the Clinical Engineering Department (CED) within 
the hospital. The specific activities of the MERM process are, as coded by several 
international standards (AS/NZS 4360:2004; ISO 14971:2007; ISO 31000:2009) regarding risk 
management applied to general production processes and specifically to the design and 
production of medical devices (but addressed to manufacturers, not the users, of medical 
equipment) as follows:  
‚ risk identification  
‚ risk analysis and assessment (including risk prioritization);  
‚ planning of actions to mitigate the risk; 
‚ tracking of information about the implemented actions; 
‚ control and follow up. 
All the standards stress that the task of risk assessment, along with risk identification,. is the 
most important element. This is mainly because all the measures the CED (as well as the 
healthcare organization as a whole) will take to reduce the level of risk will depend on the 
results of these two phases: an error in assessment would probably lead to several mistakes 
(and therefore waste of economical and human resources) in the subsequent phases.  
Given below is a brief description of the methods available for addressing risk analysis and 
assessment. However, a thorough analysis of the remaining phases is left to the reader, since 
they require the active involvement of several lines of professionals,  and thus are  strongly 
dependent on the organizational and operational arrangements of the specific healthcare 
facility.  
2.1.1 Methods and techniques 
Risk identification and risk analysis are processes aimed at identifying the type of hazard 
and determining the potential severity associated with an identified risk and the probability 
that a harmful event will occur. Together, these factors establish the “seriousness of a risk” 
and guide the clinical engineer’s choice of an appropriate “risk treatment” strategy 
(including preventive maintenance, user training, definition of a renewal plan, etc.). 
Techniques for risk identification and assessment are various and dependent on the specific 
kind of hazard under assessment. In the healthcare sector, two techniques are widely and 
commonly used: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Root Cause Analysis. 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic process for identifying potential 
process and technical failures, with the intent to eliminate them or minimize their 
likelihood, before they occur, that is in advance of the occurrence of the adverse event 
related to the analyzed risk (American Society for Healthcare Risk Management [ASHRM], 
2002). Initiated in the 1940s by the U.S. Defense Department, FMEA was further developed 
by the aerospace and automobile industries, but it was only in the late 1960s that it was first 
applied to healthcare processes. Since then, in the healthcare sector, Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis has been developed as a systematic, proactive method for evaluating 
clinical processes to identify where and how they might fail, and to assess the relative 
impact (in terms of damage to patients, workers and facilities) of different failures in order 
to identify the parts of the process that are most in need of change.  
The rationale of FMEA is the acknowledgement that errors are inevitable and predictable, 
and thus can be anticipated and/or minimized by design. 
As suggested by the name, the focus is on the Failure Mode (defined as the incorrect behavior 
of a subsystem or component due to a physical or human reason), on the Effect (defined as 
the consequences of a failure on operation, function or functionality, or status of some item) 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Biomedical Engineering 
 
172 
and, potentially (in which case the acronym becomes FMECA) on Criticality (defined as the 
combination of the probability that a failure will occur and the severity of its effect on the 
system or subsystem). In other words FMEA (or FMECA) analysis aims to identify and 
analyze 
‚ All potential failure modes of a system and components of the system; 
‚ The effects these failures may have on the system and parts of the system; 
‚ How to avoid or reduce the probability of the failures, or mitigate the effects of the 
failures on the system. 
Depicted below is a schematic, step-by-step description of how to conduct the FMEA 
process: 
1. Define the FMEA topic. 
‚ Write a clear definition of the process to be studied. 
‚ Narrow the scope of the review so that it is manageable, and the actions are 
practical and able to be implemented. 
2. Assemble the Team.  
‚ Guarantee the multidisciplinarity of the team by including expert representatives 
of all affected areas. 
‚ Identify the team leader/coordinator. 
3. Prepare a graphic description of the process 
‚ Create and verify the flow chart. 
‚ Number each process step. 
‚ For complex processes, specify the area to focus on. 
‚ Identify and create a flow chart of the subprocesses. 
4. Conduct a Hazard Analysis 
‚ List all possible/potential failure modes for each process/subprocess. 
‚ List all the possible causes of the failure mode (each failure mode may have multiple 
failure mode causes). 
‚ Determine the “severity (S)”, “probability (P)” and “detectability (D).” 
‚ Determine the Risk Priority Number (RPN = S x P x D).  
‚ Determine if the failure mode warrants further action (e.g. RPN > 32). 
5. Actions and Outcome Measures 
‚ identify actions or strategies to reduce the Risk Priority Number for each failure 
mode 
The other widely adopted methodology is Root Cause Analysis (RCA) that aims to assess 
risks affecting healthcare activities by investigating the adverse events which have occurred. 
RCA is an analytic tool for performing a comprehensive, system-based review of critical 
incidents. It includes the identification of the root cause and contributory factors, 
determination of risk reduction strategies, and development of action plans along with 
measurement strategies to evaluate the effectiveness of the plans (Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute [CPSI], 2006). Unlike FMEA, which is a proactive and preventive process, RCA is 
carried out retrospectively in response to a specific, harmful event. 
The main purpose of the RCA is to uncover the factor(s) that led to and caused the serious 
preventable adverse event. The preventable adverse event is very often the tip of the 
iceberg. Conducting and writing an RCA is an opportunity to examine how the systems for 
providing care function. The more areas investigated, the greater the possibility the 
system(s) will become better functioning and prevent the next event from occurring. 
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RCA focuses on the “how” and the “why”, not on the “who”. The goals of a root cause 
analysis are to determine: 
‚ what happened; 
‚ why it happened; 
‚ what can be done to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. 
A step by step description of the RCA may be depicted as follows: 
1. Plan of action 
‚ strategies the organization intends to implement in order to reduce the risk of 
similar events occurring in the future. 
‚ responsibility for implementation, supervision, pilot testing as appropriate, time 
lines, and strategies for  measuring the effectiveness of the actions. 
2. What happened / Facts of the event 
‚ Information about the patient 
‚ Details of the event 
‚ Use of interviews, brain storming, or written description, etc. 
3. Why it happened 
‚ Individuate the contributory factors 
4. Identify root causes 
‚ Identification of the “Root Causes” 
5. Minimize recurrence/monitoring 
‚ Implementation of each specific action that will be measured and communicated 
The final goal of both methodologies is to address the commitment of healthcare 
organizations to reduce the likelihood or severity of adverse events. However, besides their 
technical, practical and philosophical differences, both present a major fault/drawback 
when applied to the specific case of medical equipment risk assessment. In fact, the methods 
themselves require some form of subjective assessment, mainly due to lack of quantitative 
data on which the assessment could be based. Moreover, to assess the risk related to the 
entire biomedical technological assets of healthcare facilities would certainly require a more 
systematic and structured method for collecting and processing data. 
A possible solution to this problem could be an adapted implementation of the Risk Map or 
Risk Matrix (Ruge, 2004; Cox, 2008). A risk matrix (risk map) is a table (Cartesian diagram) 
that presents on its rows (y-axis), the category of probability (or likelihood or frequency) and on 
its columns (x-axis), the category of severity (or impact or consequences). Each cell of the table 
(or point in the Cartesian plane), which mathematically represents the product of the 
probability and severity values, is associated to a level of risk that eventually identifies the 
urgency or priority of the required mitigation actions. 
The figure 1 shows an example of risk matrix, where probability and severity have been 
split into a range of five values, whereas risk level is categorized into three classes. 
Thus, the risk assessment problem can be reduced to the estimate of probability and severity 
values. The estimate of severity does not present any particular concerns: by analyzing 
equipment design and features (such as, also, the FDA or CE risk classification), device user 
manual, clinical procedure and medical room in which the ME is used, it should be easy to 
determine  the maximum possible damage the ME could do to the patient (or even to the 
operator). Moreover, such elements can be easily described by specifically defined numeric 
variables (for instance, all the considered aspects can be assigned values ranging from 1 to 5, 
in analogy with the main Risk Matrix axe values) and recorded in the equipment 
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management system used by the CED. Lastly, by defining a computation method (whose 
complexity can vary from a very simple linear sum up to more complex fuzzy or neural 
network systems) the severity value can be associated to each ME owned by the healthcare 
facility. 
However, the achievement of a robust, objective estimate of probability definitely presents 
more difficulties. In particular, it would be preferable to take into account only measurable 
characteristics, thus using easily quantifiable numeric variables. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCE 
Minor Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 5 
L
IK
L
IH
O
O
D
 
Rare  1      
Unlikely  2      
Likely  3      
Expected  4      
Certain  5      
Harm occurrence Likelihood levels 
- -Certain: will occur on every occasion 
- Expected: is expected to occur in most 
circumstances (e.g. more than 2 times a year) 
- Likely: could occur in many circumstances 
(e.g. probable to happen up to 2 times a 
year) 
- Unlikely: could occur occasionally (e.g. 
possibility of happening once a year) 
- Rare: not expected to happen, but is possible 
(even if no occurrence registered) 
Harm severity levels 
- Catastrophic: multiple deaths 
- Major: possibility of death or major permanent 
loss of function (motor, sensory, physiologic, or 
intellectual) 
- Serious: major injury / adverse health outcome 
(e.g. possibility of permanent lessening of bodily 
functioning) 
- Moderate : moderate injury / adverse health 
outcome (e.g. increased length of stay) 
- Minor: no or minor injury/adverse health 
outcome; 
Estimated risk levels: –Red: unacceptable risk –Yellow: tolerable risk –Green: acceptable risk 
Fig. 1. Example of Risk Matrix 
The complexity of estimating probability stems from the fact that probability is dependent 
on three main different but inter-influenced issues: human factor, medical device 
functional reliability, medical device design and environmental characteristics (Brueley, 
1989; Anderson, 1990; Dillon, 2000; FDA, 1997; FDA, 2000; Samore, et al., 2004).  So, 
estimating the probability value must take into account the evaluation of these three 
elements. In estimating the human factor element, one must take into account not only 
those characteristics of the ME, of the process and/or of the environment that may 
facilitate a human error leading to an adverse event,  but also the factors that may make 
the operator take corrective action for a ME or system failure. The ME functional 
reliability refers to the potential for device (material and/or functional) failure, potentially 
leading to an adverse event. Aspects to be considered are those related to the device 
reliability assessment such as the execution of safety checks, assessment of device 
obsolescence, and respect of a preventive maintenance plan. Medical device design and 
environmental characteristics are those related respectively to the possibility of the ME 
having specific features that could lead to an adverse event without the occurrence of 
material or functional failure or human error, and to the presence of environmental 
factors that could  cause the ME to fail. 
www.intechopen.com
 Clinical Engineering 
 
175 
When defining the elements to be analyzed on each ME owned by the hospital, two 
considerations apply: 
‚ Define measurable variables more quantitatively.  
‚ Prefer elements (variables) already monitored by the organization and recorded in an 
information system (such as the ME management system used by the CED) 
Table 1 shows an example of variables for probability estimation.  
 
Human factor 
Medical device 
functional reliability 
Medical device design and 
environmental characteristics  
Availability (at point of use) of 
complete written instructions 
(e.g., user manual) from the 
manufacturer 
Device obsolescence 
Appropriateness of wiring 
according to clinical activities and 
devices 
Device ergonomics 
Existence and respect of 
a preventive 
maintenance plan 
Environmental conditions (noise, 
temperature, vibrations, 
electromagnetic interference, etc.) 
Difficult working conditions 
(staff shortage, staff shifts, etc.) 
Results of safety checks 
(cfr. IEC or ISO or EN 
safety standards) 
The device is appropriate for the 
clinical needs for which it is 
intended 
Environmental conditions 
(noise, temperature, lighting, 
space, etc.) 
  
Schedule and records of a 
training and education 
program on the use of specific 
ME and its related risks  
  
Table 1. List of possible variables for estimation of probability. 
As is done for estimating severity, the last step consists of defining a computation method to 
elaborate the identified variables. Also, in this case the complexity of the method may vary 
from a very simple linear sum up to more complex fuzzy or neural network systems. 
3. Health Technology Assessment 
Nowadays many factors, ranging from the aging of population to the continuous fast-
paced technology innovation, as well as the even more critical scarcity of economic 
resources, emphasize the importance of correct resource allocation at every level of a 
national health care system. This background adds to the criticality and complexity of 
decision-making, rendering essential a thorough evaluation which takes into 
consideration all the areas (health benefits, risks, costs, etc.) where health technology may 
have an impact.. 
A variety of specific methods and tools are available to support health care and medical 
decision making, for example Health Technology Assessment (HTA), a standardized 
methodology that can help decision makers select the most appropriate choice for their 
specific context. 
HTA is a multidisciplinary process that systematically examines the technical performance, 
safety, clinical efficacy, effectiveness, cost, cost-effectiveness ratio, organizational 
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implications, social consequences and legal and ethical considerations of the application of a 
health technology  (EUNEHTA). 
 
Advances in science and engineering 
Intellectual property, especially patent protection 
Aging population 
 “Cascade” effects of unnecessary tests, unexpected results, patient or physician anxiety 
Emerging pathogens and other disease threats 
Third-party payment 
Inability of third-party payers to limit coverage 
Financial incentives of technology companies, clinicians, and others 
Clinician specialty training at academic medical centers 
Malpractice avoidance 
Provider competition to offer state-of-the-art technology 
Public demand driven by consumer awareness, direct-to-consumer advertising, and mass 
media reports 
Strong economies, high employment 
Table 2. Factors that reinforce the market for health technology (Goodman 2004) 
The term “health technology” is quite broad and includes the following categories: drugs, 
biologics, medical devices, equipment and supplies, medical and surgical procedures, 
support systems, organizational and managerial systems.  
HTA may address the direct, intended consequences of technologies as well as their 
indirect, unintended consequences; its main purpose is to inform technology-related policy-
making in health care.  
HTA is increasingly used in American and European countries to inform decision- and 
policy-making in the health care sector and several countries have integrated HTA into 
policy, governance, reimbursement or regulatory processes. 
3.1 Conducting an HTA process 
An HTA process is conducted by interdisciplinary groups using explicit analytical 
frameworks drawing from a variety of methods: given the variety of impacts addressed and 
the range of methods that may be used in an assessment, several types of experts are needed 
in HTA.  
Depending upon the topic and scope of assessment, these may include a selection of the 
following  (Goodman, 2004): 
‚ Physicians, nurses, dentists, and other 
clinicians 
‚ Patients or patient representatives 
‚ Epidemiologists 
‚ Managers of hospitals, clinics,  
nursing homes, and other health care 
institutions 
‚ Biostatisticians 
‚ Economists 
‚ Lawyers 
‚ Radiology technicians, laboratory 
technicians and other health 
professionals 
‚ Social scientists 
‚ Ethicists 
‚ Decision scientists 
‚ Clinical and biomedical engineers  ‚ Computer scientists/programmers 
‚ Pharmacologists ‚ Librarians/information specialists 
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According to a recent study there are also significant differences in the practical application 
of HTA. Whereas in some countries HTA merely studies the clinical effectiveness and 
perhaps safety and cost-effectiveness of technologies, agencies in other countries apply a 
broader perspective and also consider other issues, such as ethics, and organizational, social 
or legal aspects of technology. 
It is also known that the HTA activities can be carried out at different levels of health-care 
systems: 
‚ macro level (international and national - i.e. decision-making within central 
government institutions) 
‚ meso level (administrative level - i.e. regional or provincial health authorities, agencies, 
primary health-care units or hospitals); 
‚ micro level (clinical practice) 
At each of these levels, however, these activities should be carried out by a multidisciplinary 
staff, involving clinicians, clinical engineers, economists, epidemiologists, etc.) and, 
depending on the object of evaluation, also by specifically qualified professionals from the 
hospital departments.  
 
Assessment reason 
New technology Safety concerns 
Changes in old technology Ethical concerns 
New indications for old technology Economic concerns 
New findings Investment decisions 
Structural/organizational changes  
Table 3. Reasons for performing an assessment (Velasco, et al., 2002) 
3.2 The technical evaluation 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, HTA now represents a multidimensional field of 
inquiry that increasingly responds to broad social forces such as citizen participation, 
accelerated technological innovation, and the allocation of scarce resources among 
competing priorities (Battista, 2006).  
However,, this methodology was initially focused and applied on a small scale, concerning 
(clinical) engineering questions pertaining to a technology’s safety and technical 
performances, and involving the investigation of one or more properties, impacts, or other 
features of health technologies or applications. 
The technical evaluation represents, in fact, the core object of Clinical Engineering  (CE) 
activity in HTA and is often conducted at a meso level. Many hospitals are increasingly 
developing HTA processes by means of HTA Commissions or structured HTA Unit, that 
include the CED. 
In the Health Technology, CED are typically involved in the technical evaluation of the medical 
electrical equipment (as defined by the IEC 60601-1-1 normative) and sometimes of medical 
devices. 
The main features characterizing these kinds of technologies can be summarized as follows: 
‚ fast-changing technologies: their development is characterized by a constant flow of 
incremental product improvements; 
‚ device impact on clinical and safety outcome depends on user training and experience 
that can vary and are hard to evaluate; 
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‚ the life cycle of a device is often as short as 18–24 months, which is considerably less 
than, for example, pharmaceuticals; 
‚ the clinical application of the technology and potential utility for patients (accuracy or 
effectiveness) in comparison with the reference standard; 
‚ improvement in the operating principle; 
‚ state of development of technology (emerging, new, established); 
‚ impact on organization (implementation phase, change in the treatment, users’ 
qualification, IT requirements, etc.); 
‚ impact on patient and user safety; 
‚ economic aspects (acquisition, maintenance, spare parts, training, etc.); 
‚ devices cannot be evaluated by RCTs – hard to blind and randomize. Early evaluation 
not possible 
 
 
Health technology: any intervention that may be used to 
promote health, to prevent, diagnose or treat disease 
or for rehabilitation or long-term care. This includes 
the pharmaceuticals, devices, procedures and 
organizational systems used in health care  (INAHTA) 
Medical device: any instrument, apparatus, appliance, 
software, material or other article, whether used alone 
or in combination, including the software intended by 
its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic 
and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its 
proper application, intended by the manufacturer to be 
used for human beings for the purpose of diagnosis, 
prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of 
disease  (European Directive 2007/47/EC) 
Medical electrical equipment (CEI EN 60601-1): electrical 
equipment having an applied part or transferring 
energy to or from the patient or detecting such energy 
transfer to or from the patient and which is: 
a. provided with not more than one connection to a 
particular  mains supply; and 
b. intended by its manufacturer to be used: 
1. in the diagnosis, treatment, or monitoring of a 
patient; or 
2. for compensation or alleviation of disease, injury 
or disability 
Fig. 2. Representation of Health Technology, Medical Device and Medical Electrical 
Equipment sets 
A further classification of medical electrical equipment can be made according to their main 
characteristics or function. For instance, as can be found in the Italian CIVAB classification, 
medical electrical equipment can be grouped in three technological compartments: 
‚ Functional explorations and therapeutic equipment; 
‚ Medical laboratory or clinical chemistry equipment; 
‚ Bio-imaging equipment. 
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The HTA process, while maintaining a uniform and systematic approach, may have to 
primarily focus on different characteristics because of the different weighting or different 
evaluation methodologies for the following aspects: 
‚ Innovation ‚ Safety 
‚ Technology management ‚ Efficacy 
‚ Investment (big ticket technology; high 
volume purchase; service) 
‚ Organization. 
Functional explorations and therapeutic equipment often undergo relevant innovation, such as 
that involving the change of the physical or biological operating principle, which is difficult 
to evaluate empirically (“impossibility” of randomized controlled trial (RCT), short Time To 
Market vs short mean life). As regards safety, electromedical equipment are regulated by 
directives and technical norms that constitute not only a fair guarantee of their safety but 
also a valid guide to evaluate it for the specific context of its intended utilization. Moreover, 
patient safety strongly depends on user education and training in equipment use. 
Equipment’s efficacy is often evaluated only by design data or in vitro or animal model 
tests. As such devices represent the greater part of an institute’s biomedical equipment 
assets, organizational, economical and management issues become fairly important: 
uniformity of equipment can facilitate technological management (including risk issues), 
rationalize maintenance, take advantage of scale factors (equipment acquisition and 
renewal, consumables/spare parts). 
Assessment of innovation for Medical Laboratory equipment has to accommodate the 
continuous introduction of new reagents and controls as well as the presence of homebrew 
technology, particularly in the most advanced fields such as Proteomics and Metabolomics. 
As concerns the management of these technologies, uniformity of equipment is also 
important for better and easier use by the operators, and ensures the availability of backup 
equipment. The most common mode of acquisition is by rental or service, where the cost of 
the equipment is included in the cost of the reagents.  
Bio-Imaging equipment have been subject to innovations in virtually all aspects of their 
functioning, e.g. improvement of technical performances (e.g. spatial resolution), change in 
physical or biological operating principle (e.g. fMRI), safety for operators and patients (e.g. 
X-ray dose reduction). Their empirical evaluation is usually more practicable than for other 
kinds of equipment, particularly when testing no side-effects of technologies. Patient and 
operator safety relies on operational, technical and organizational issues (e.g. use of 
minimum dose setting for x-ray exams, implementing X-ray or magnetic shielding walls and 
ceilings, limiting access to exam room). As their complexity increases, so does the 
importance of user education and training to ensure a safe use of all the technological 
facilities. These kinds of technologies may have a very high cost both for their acquisition 
and for the necessary structural changes. 
The aim of the HTA process, developed within a healthcare facility, is to guide decision- 
makers on the “correct” acquisition or implementation of a health technology, from different 
viewpoints: 
‚ clinical : efficacy, risk/benefit rate, effect on current clinical procedures; 
‚ technological: technical and technological efficacy, technical specifications (technological 
and structural interfaces), management and maintenance activities; 
‚ enterprise : efficiency, productivity, impact on human (acceptability) and/or structural 
(e.g., need for building changes) and/or technological (e.g., need for HIS changes) 
resources. 
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3.1.1 Methods for technical evaluation 
The evaluation of the technical characteristics of a device can be performed in different 
ways. A technique based on the European network for Health Technology Assessment 
(EUnetHTA) model is described below. 
The EUnetHTA proposes an assessment scheme based on a basic unit, called assessment 
element. Each element defines a piece of information that describes the technology or the 
consequences or implications of its use, or the patients and the disease for which it is 
applied. An assessment element is composed of an evaluation area, a macro key performance 
indicator and a micro key performance indicator (see Figure 3a). 
The evaluation area (domain) represents a wide framework within which the technology is 
considered. It provides an angle of viewing the use, consequences and implications of any 
technology. The following domains are considered: 
The nature of the elements may vary across domains, since the consequences and 
implications are understood and studied differently in each domain. The following domains 
are considered: 
1. Health problem and current use of technology 
2. Technical specifications 
3. Safety 
4. Clinical effectiveness 
5. Costs and economic evaluation 
6. Ethical analysis 
7. Organizational aspects 
8. Social aspects 
9. Legal aspects. 
A Macro Key Performance Indicator (Macro KPI or topic) represents a more specific area of 
consideration within any of the evaluation areas. One evaluation area is divided into several 
Macro KPIs. Similar Macro KPIs may be assigned to more than one evaluation area. A Micro 
Key Performance Indicator (Micro KPI or issue) is a specific area of consideration within any of 
the Macro KPI. One Macro KPI typically consists of several Micro KPIs, but it may also 
contain only one Micro KPI.  
The first task to accomplish in order to carry out the HTA process relates to the 
identification and definition of each KPI. To do this, the following steps are required: 
Step 1. Literature search 
A thorough literature analysis should be carried out by consulting the most important 
bibliographical sources such as clinical search engines (Pubmed, Medline, ISI Web of 
Knowledge, Cochrane Library, etc.), the national and international website of the HTA 
Agency (INAHTA, HTAi, EUnetHTA, Euroscan) or Institutes (ECRI, FDA, etc.), clinical 
practice guidelines, grey literature (technical reports from government agencies or scientific 
research groups, working papers from research groups or committees, white papers, or 
preprints). Other potential sources of data are manufacturers of the technology, clinicians, 
nurses, paramedics and patients. 
The search can be performed by using main keywords for the technology in question (for 
example limiting the research in “abstract/title” OR “topic” fields). The most interesting 
results of these searches are selected and details investigated in order to intensify and 
develop the assessment. 
Step 2. Identify the assessment elements  
The analysis of the literature should therefore lead to the definition of the assessment 
elements, which are the core of the assessment. They are categorized into “evaluation area”, 
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“macro KPI” and “micro KPI”. In order to make the assessment as objective as possible, the 
specific characteristics that support the assessment of a single area (and, subsequently, of the 
whole health technology) must be fully and measurably detailed, therefore objective and 
“instrumentally” measurable indicators are preferred. Moreover, those KPI that cannot be 
evaluated a priori should be excluded from the assessment. 
Typically, the unit of measurement of KPIs may be: 
‚ metric (e.g. spatial resolution, image uniformity, laser spot size, analytical specificity, etc.) 
‚ expressed as a percentage of coverage of the clinical/production/technical needs (e.g. 
percentage of coverage of analytical test panel; percentage of coverage of nominal 
"productivity"); 
‚ ON/OFF (presence/absence of a specific feature or functionality) 
 
Numerical 
Value 
Verbal Scale Explanation 
1 Equal importance of both elements Two elements contribute equally 
3 
Moderate importance of one element 
compared to another 
Experience and judgment favor one 
element over another 
5 
Strong importance of one element 
compared to another 
An element is strongly favored  
7 
Very strong importance of one element 
compared to another 
An element is very strongly dominant 
9 
Extreme importance of one element 
compared to another 
An element is favored by at least one  
order of magnitude 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values  
Used to reach a compromise between 
two judgments 
Table 4. Saaty scale 
Step 3. Weight of the indicators  
After the assessment elements have been identified, it is necessary to define the decision-
making framework and in particular to estimate the value of the weight of each element: 
such activity must involve the whole multidisciplinary evaluation team. 
The definition of the weights, in fact, is a constituent part of the mathematical model of data 
processing, selected among those available in literature, such as the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP), expert systems based on Artificial Neural Network (ANN), and 
methodologies based on decision Fuzzy logic or Support Vector Machine (SVM). 
With reference to AHP, for example, a structured questionnaire with a series of "pairwise 
comparisons" between the assessment elements can be used: each team member will be 
required, therefore, to compare on a qualitative scale e.g., Saaty scale, see table 4) the 
relative importance of the two compared elements. Finally, after the comparison of all pairs, 
the weight of each indicator will be calculated. 
Step 4. Value of the indicators  
The next step is to assess each technological alternative (the subject of the assessment) on the 
basis of the mathematical framework so far implemented. For this purpose, we assign 
values (quantitative or qualitative) to each lowest level KPI (usually a micro KPI, but also 
macro KPI and, rarely, even an evaluation area), on the basis of available literature data, and 
technical specifications or expert judgment. These values are then aggregated by the 
computational model to produce the value and rank of the single health technology. 
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Fig. 3. a) The assessment element ; b) Combination of evaluation areas, macro KPI and  
micro KPI 
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Step 4. Results 
The results obtained by aggregating the values can be represented graphically or through 
numerical reports. In particular, results can be processed to allow, for example: 
‚ the comparison between the technological alternatives in order to show the 
performance on each evaluation area and/or macro KPI and/or Micro KPI; 
‚ the comparison between weights of evaluation areas, macro and micro KPIs 
‚ analysis of the evaluation tree with evidence of weighted values for each technological 
alternative 
‚ etc. 
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Fig. 4. Example of graphical representation of comparison of two health technologies 
The HTA report 
The final HTA report must provide the decision-makers with a clear, understandable 
summary of the information described above, in order to help them select the most 
appropriate technology. Moreover, it is essential to follow a standardized scheme, 
preferably one from a HTA agency or scientific community. However, it cannot be 
considered acceptable  unless it contains the following sections: 
‚ document summary; 
‚ description of the technical characteristics and operating modalities of analyzed 
technologies; 
‚ summary of findings of literature search; 
‚ description of the criteria, indicators, macro and micro KPI; 
‚ definition of weights; 
‚ assigned values and mathematical processing method; 
‚ results (e.g., ranking, charts, graphs, etc.) 
‚ bibliography 
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4. Technology management 
Hundreds to many thousands of medical devices may need to be managed in a healthcare 
facility, with several million Euros being invested each year for the acquisition of new 
health technologies and for planned technology replacement, while thousands of 
maintenance processes per year are required in order to maintain the efficiency of these 
devices. As evident from the analysis of adverse events occurring during the last few 
years, serious incidents can often be related to the malfunctioning of medical devices. In 
particular, a high degree of obsolescence of the technologies, as well as missed, 
inadequate or improper maintenance, are among the possible causes of failure not 
attributable to the manufacturer. Therefore, in every healthcare facility, responsibility for 
the safe management of medical devices should be identified. The CED can provide a 
relevant contribution to the prevention of adverse events resulting from medical device 
failures by the technical and clinical assessment of the technologies to be acquired and 
proper management of maintenance. Different organizational models can be used to 
manage the above mentioned activities (Italian Ministry of Health, 2009): an internal 
service with employees of the healthcare facility; a mixed service, with internal control by 
clinical engineers as well as by means of maintenance contracts with manufacturers and 
technicians who may either be employees of the healthcare facility or of specialized 
companies; finally, an external service, with technical assistance entirely outsourced to a 
“global service” provider. Each of these three models has advantages and disadvantages. 
The first approach allows timely intervention and a better control of maintenance 
activities; however it is only justified when there is a sufficiently large quantity of 
technological equipment in the healthcare facility, and also requires the continuous 
training of the technical staff: Furthermore, maintenance contracts with manufacturers are 
still necessary for high-technology equipment. The second model permits flexibility as 
regards the organizational structure of the healthcare facility, internal control of 
processes, and a better integration of skills. The last organizational model is often 
preferred by healthcare facilities that do not yet have a CED; it allows organizational 
flexibility, but requires a careful selection of a qualified external company and 
authoritative supervision by the healthcare facility staff, otherwise control of the 
processes will be progressively lost and the quality of service will deteriorate.  
4.1 Preventive and corrective maintenance, safety and performance tests 
Maintenance of medical devices has gradually evolved from the operational repair of out of 
order equipment to a management function aimed at preventing breakdown and failures, 
thus reducing risks associated with the use of medical devices, decreasing downtime and 
contributing to the improvement of diagnostic and therapeutic pathways, where technology 
is a key determinant. Healthcare facilities should identify responsibilities for maintenance 
and plan maintenance activities based on a detailed definition of methods, resources (i.e., 
operators, laboratories, measuring equipment, and maintenance contracts with external 
suppliers) and tools for supervision of the activities (e.g. dedicated software for the 
maintenance data management). To ensure adequate quality and safety standards and the 
rationalization of maintenance activities, a plan for maintenance and safety tests must be 
implemented, taking into account, for each device, the risks for patients and operators, 
degree of criticality and function of the device (e.g., therapeutic, diagnostic, or analytical). 
Within the European Community, preventive maintenance must be planned by the 
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manufacturer prior to marketing the device. The 2007/47/EC Directive states that “the 
instructions for use must contain ... details of the nature and frequency of the maintenance 
and calibration needed to ensure that the devices operate properly and safely at all times”. 
Preventive maintenance is of critical importance for ensuring the safe use of devices. 
Therefore, a preventive maintenance plan for each device must be defined, well documented 
and available at all operational levels to personnel responsible for  maintenance tasks, 
including daily maintenance. Documentation should include informative documents and 
specific operating instructions which take into account both mandatory technical regulations 
and the service and user manuals provided by the manufacturer. Preventive maintenance is 
particularly relevant for life support devices, equipment for diagnosis and treatment, and 
devices identified as critical in relation to specific aspects such as the intended use of the 
device, class of risk, clinical features, type of location in which it is installed (e.g,. operating 
room, intensive care unit, ward), and presence of backup units. In carrying out the 
maintenance, the responsible technician must take into account all the maintenance 
instructions provided mandatorily by the manufacturer. Without affecting the liability of the 
manufacturer for any original product defects or faults, the person(s) performing 
maintenance will assume direct responsibility for all events deriving from this action. It is 
therefore essential that technicians, whether internal or external (see par. 5), have specific 
and proven experience. Training programs should be planned and preferably technicians 
should be trained by the manufacturers of the technologies which they maintain. Software 
for medical use deserves special consideration. Due to the complexity of systems and 
interactions, software behaviour may not be completely deterministic even when principles 
of good design practice are respected. Thus, software maintenance, which is usually 
performed by the manufacturer, should be supervised by the healthcare facility. Safety and 
performance tests must be periodically performed in order to ensure compliance with the 
essential safety requirements set by technical standards. The frequency of tests should be 
established taking into account criticality of device and according to reference guidelines. 
Particular attention is required in testing devices that can be used for critical applications 
(e.g., ventilators, anesthesia machines, infusion pumps, defibrillators, electrosurgical units) 
and for devices emitting or detecting ionizing radiations. Specific procedures and forms for 
different types of devices should be adopted to examine, measure, and verify the conformity 
of the device with the current mandatory technical standards and the instructions contained 
in the user manuals provided by the manufacturer. Dedicated equipment, for which 
calibration must be regularly performed and documented, should be used to measure 
parameters specific to each type of technology. Strategies for improving maintenance will 
only succeed if supervised effectively by external maintenance technicians in order to ensure 
their compliance with the agreed conditions (see par. 5). All relevant data relating to the life 
cycle of each device (from acceptance testing to disposal) must be recorded and made 
available at different operational levels. In order to ensure full traceability of the 
maintenance processes, preventive and corrective maintenance activities must be 
documented by detailed technical reports. In particular, preventive maintenance notice 
should be used to document the regularity of activities. Forms for maintenance requests to 
the CED must be defined and corrective maintenance notice should contain data useful for 
the identification of appropriate indicators (e.g. frequency of failures, time of first 
intervention, time to resolution, average downtime, distribution of failure types, 
maintenance costs, cost of spare parts), through which the condition of installed medical 
equipment can be analyzed. 
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4.2 Issues in inventory management 
Establishing a complete and reliable inventory of medical equipment and ensuring the 
quality of the data is a complex task. Several different kinds of events, although rare, can 
lead to discrepancies between the inventory database and the technologies actually being 
used in a healthcare facility. These mismatches can be significantly reduced by establishing 
appropriate procedures and ensuring their strict observance. However, the large number of 
operators, devices and suppliers, the need to give priority to emergency care and the 
difficulty in directly and continuously monitoring the use of all devices in the healthcare 
facility, may inevitably produce such discrepancies. Failure to follow correct procedures for 
new equipment commissioning, for equipment transfer between departments, or for 
equipment disposal, are among the many possible events that could cause these 
mismatches. One possible solution is the use of Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags 
and asset tracking systems. However, the use of this approach is limited because of ongoing 
debate about  electromagnetic compatibility issues, and because the considerable cost of 
installation and management of these systems makes them still out of reach of most 
healthcare facilities. Until an advanced asset tracking solution is lacking in a healthcare 
facility, alternative strategies need to be implemented to keep the inventory data up-to-date. 
One way to monitor and update inventory data is through preventive and corrective 
maintenance or safety tests performed by CED technicians or by external service providers. 
Finally, it may be necessary to plan periodic inventory checks, which will be carried out 
independently or collaboratively by the CED and/or by the assets management office. Such 
controls may also provide an opportunity to remove devices that are no longer in use but 
are kept in stock and which may represent a source of risk. 
4.3 Acquisitions and replacement plan 
During the last decades, planning health technology acquisitions has become of strategic 
importance for healthcare organizations, both at the national and at facility level. Such 
planning is also essential task for the reduction of clinical risk associated with the use of 
medical devices. The importance of acquisition planning is also determined by the 
considerable increase in technology investments, which is due to the increase in number and 
rapid technological evolution of medical devices and systems.  
Therefore, healthcare organizations should define specific methods for planning the 
acquisition of health technology. Such methods should take into account the obsolescence of 
devices, the evolution of technical standards, the possibility of improving safety for patients 
and healthcare operators, the possible availability of innovative technologies for improving 
clinical performance, as well as considerations about actual or expected clinical needs, 
economic or technical feasibility, organizational changes, and investment priorities (e.g., 
innovative technologies vs device renewal). Moreover, the availability of adequate 
infrastructure, staff and consumables for the equipment must be foreseen in order to ensure 
full use of the benefits provided by the new technology. The decision to proceed with the 
acquisition should be conditional on the presence of a detailed clinical, economic and 
technical assessment with well defined comparative criteria, carried out by qualified and 
multidisciplinary staff and inspired by the principles of HTA (see par. 2). An equipment 
replacement plan is aimed at better identification of investment priorities for device renewal 
and may be based on the definition of a replacement priority value (RPV). RPV is an index 
which represents synthetically the level of urgency for the replacement of each device, 
permitting determination of a replacement priority ranking and planning of a progressive 
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replacement of technologies (Fennigkoh, 1992). Variables considered by the RPV 
computational algorithm may come from different sources, principally the CED database 
and clinical activities records. Variables must be carefully chosen, according to the 
organization of the healthcare facility and based on data availability. In fact, the effort 
needed for collecting new data and keeping it up-to-date must be considered in order to 
limit the amount of new data to be collected and to make the best use of the data already 
available. A typical model for computing the RPV is based on the use of component indexes, 
with each index highlighting the impact on a specific aspect of the device replacement. A 
coefficient must be assigned to each component index in order to weight its contribution to 
the RPV. Possible aspects that might be taken into account, by defining specific numeric 
variables, are obsolescence of the device, maintainability (e.g. cost and availability of spare 
parts), reliability (e.g. downtime or number of failures), criticality, strategic impact, clinical 
efficacy, efficiency, clinical risk, potential for performance improvement. For example, the 
cost of replaced spare parts, the number of technical activities performed by the technicians 
of the CED, the annual cost of contracts and the cost of technical assistance by external 
suppliers will be taken into account in the computation of the component index for 
maintenance costs. 
5. Technical and economic issues in management of service contracts 
A quality assurance requirement for  clinical assistance is the implementation of related 
processes based on the principles of best/good practice standards. In the field of 
management of medical devices, this concept is fundamental for meeting  the need of 
retaining costs and providing effectiveness in patient care. 
CEDs are also evaluated as to their ability to implement a policy of Good Management 
Practice of biomedical technologies (Cheng & Dyro, 2004). Related economic aspects, such as 
medical equipment maintenance costs, are a critical issue of such management (Table 5). 
 
Element  Financial 
Internal 
processes 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Training and 
continuing education 
for CE staff 
Measure 
Staffing  
Beds per full-time 
equivalent employee 
Service/Acquisition 
ratio 
Percent of IPM  
Complete IPM 
interval  
IPM time  
Repair time 
Annual 
survey 
Time spent on these 
activities 
Certifications obtained 
Table 5. A balanced performance scorecard for Benchmarking CE departments  
(Gaev, 2010a) 
Clinical engineers play a fundamental role in determining the proper strategy for medical 
equipment maintenance and in recognizing the best available option for supporting these 
activities. More specifically, the CED is in charge of setting the expected level of 
performance, monitoring the quality and integrity of the delivered services, dividing 
activities between  internal and external BMETs, and pursuing the goal of an expense 
reduction policy. For this reason, before maintaining biomedical technologies, CEDs 
should plan rational acquisitions, allotting  part of the organization budget for service 
contracts. 
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A service contract is an agreement between a company and a user for the maintenance, in 
this case, of medical equipment during a specific period of time, usually for a fixed price 
which may be subject to changes if maintenance activities are performed outside the user’s 
location. The term “maintenance” typically includes inspection, preventive maintenance and 
repair. The terms and conditions of the contract usually stipulate the days and hours of 
service, the types of service, the response time, and which parts to be replaced are replaced 
free of charge” (Gaev, 2010b). This sort of contract can be extended to include the free loan 
of biomedical technologies. In this case, prices stated in the service contract are for 
consumables used for the equipment’s functions, and are increased to include maintenance 
costs. 
Reasons for having a service contract for a biomedical device are several. The first reason is 
the impossibility to provide a cost-effective service through in-house CED because of the 
lack of human and logistical resources. This is particularly common in hospitals where the 
problem of cost containment is approached with the sole objective of cost cutting and with 
no other financial or economic performance policy.  
The second main cause is that healthcare governance is particularly reluctant to assume 
responsibility for equipment maintenance, and the belief that original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) service contracts represent the “gold standard” is difficult to remove. 
On the other hand, for certain classes of medical devices (those characterized by high-
technological complexity or high consumable costs, such as clinical chemistry analyzers), 
service contracts seem to be the only realistic solution for accommodating their management 
costs. The main issues which have to be discussed and negotiated in the drawing up of a 
service contract are: inspection and preventive maintenance, repair, spare parts, legal and 
financial aspects. 
The term “Inspection and Preventive Maintenance (IPM)” covers all the activities involved 
in cleaning, lubricating, adjusting, checking for wear, and perhaps replacing components 
that could cause total breakdown or serious functional impairment of the equipment before 
the next scheduled inspection (Subhan, 2006). 
These activities are well-described in the manufacturer’s service manual and are aimed at 
avoiding the breakdown of a medical device in use, without any apparent warning of 
failure. Manufacturers are obliged to explicate preventive maintenance actions to healthcare 
operators or BMETs, and to suggest the minimum inspection frequency. The definition and 
respect of a timetable  for IPM of all medical equipment is fundamental for reducing risk for 
patients and users, and preventing excessive repair costs by providing timely interventions; 
and it should be the CED’s first priority, and should be decided before carrying out 
preventive maintenance activities. 
Contracts should clearly explain the necessity of making known to all concerned the 
timetable for the maintenance by external technicians at the beginning of the year, in 
agreement with the CED and the healthcare personnel. This will allow the organization of 
clinical activities for healthcare operators and the possibility to  enter the whole agenda into 
the biomedical technology maintenance management system. One other particular 
observation relates to the availability (at the charge of the contractor) of software update if 
required for the correct operation of the biomedical instrumentation. The last consideration 
relates to the possibility  for CEDs (according to their competence) to evaluate the IPM 
requirements of medical equipment (Table 6) and to modify the service intervals 
recommended by the manufacturer, to obtain a more cost-effective maintenance without 
adversely affecting patient safety. 
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Repair (corrective maintenance) is a process to restore the physical integrity, safety and/or 
performance of a device after a failure. Aspects to be considered pertain to economic, safety 
and logistic concerns. Contracts should explain who can call for technical support: this 
aspect is fundamental for organizing the internal  maintenance process. One possible 
solution would be for the healthcare personnel to first of all attempt to resolve the problem 
by telephone (with proper manufacturer’s customer support), and to define an internal 
procedure for advising the CED of the failure. In this way, the CED can monitor failure 
resolution time by the manufacturer’s technicians by means of its maintenance management 
system. 
 
Device  Shortest IPM Interval Longest IPM Interval 
Electrosurgical unit   6 months 12 months 
Exam light  12 months No IPM performer 
Physiologic monitor  12 months 24 months 
Pulse oximeter  12 months No IPM performer 
Table 6. Variations in IPM intervals for selected equipment, proposed by ECRI Inst. (2010) 
Another significant aspect related to maintenance contracts is the definition of “bad-
management” of biomedical technologies by healthcare personnel which may  cause failure 
of the equipment. Some manufacturers are reluctant (or do not agree) to repair equipment 
under contract if abuse or improper use by hospital staff caused the failure. It is essential 
that the internal training of healthcare staff makes them aware of their responsibility for  the 
correct use of biomedical equipment. 
Moreover, in the contract, clinical engineers should define a way to evaluate the 
performance of OEM technicians, and stipulate the right to suspend the service contract in 
the event of low-quality maintenance work. 
A common aspect of IPM and repair contracts is the possibility of a partnership for 
maintenance activities between the OEM technical support and  the BMETs  (internal or 
outsourced). Some manufacturers only permit maintenance activities by qualified (and 
certified by the OEM itself) technicians. Positive results of partnership contracts were 
showed just a few years ago. A first Italian joint project between OEMs and in-house service 
was started  in 2002 (De Vivo et al., 2004): in-house personnel received adequate training, 
both generic (basic principles on which devices work) and specific (how to use, repair and 
maintain a particular model), for maintaining 90 medical devices (mostly monitoring 
equipment, ventilators and anesthesia units) in shared OEM/internal BMETs maintenance 
contracts. 
Figure 5 summarizes the success of this program. One important effect was the increased 
awareness of the OEMs about the need for a rational selection of an effective preventive 
maintenance program in which service procedures and frequencies are based on real 
world feedback, efficacy of activities are measured and areas needing improvement are 
identified. 
Clinical Engineers are also in charge of compiling  technical reports related to maintenance 
activities (for instance, by means of an appropriate software system, see par. 6). These data 
are essential for monitoring the quality of OEM services, and claiming economic  and legal 
penalties. Service contracts should also clearly explain the accuracy level of report writing, 
to avoid possible future disputes. 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Biomedical Engineering 
 
190 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
01/07/02 - 31/12/02 01/01/03 - 30/06/03 01/07/03 - 31/12/03 01/01/04 - 30/06/04
In
-h
o
u
se
 r
ep
a
ir
 (
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l)
Period
Percentage of in-house repairs
Manufacter A
Manufacter B
Manufacter C
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
re
p
a
ir
s
year
Number of OEM and in-house repairs
In-house repairs
OEM repairs
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
01/07/02 - 31/12/02 01/01/03 - 30/06/03 01/07/03 - 31/12/03
C
o
st
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 
Period
Percentage reduction of annual maintenance fees
Manufacter A
Manufacter B
Manufacter C
 
Fig. 5. a) Percentage of in-house repairs (July 2002-March 2004). The number of in-house 
repairs reached 90% and more after one year and continue to grow as in-house personnel 
sharpen their required basic skills. b) Number of OEM and in-house repairs (years 1999-2004). 
The decrease in OEM corrective maintenance was soon significant: as a consequence, OEMs 
were able to focus their attention on accurate preventive maintenance in order to prevent 
certain predictable failures. c) Percentage reduction of annual maintenance fees. Significant 
discounts were obtained based on the percentage of in-house corrective maintenance, justifying 
the cost related to internal technicians and the energies needed to set up the whole system. 
www.intechopen.com
 Clinical Engineering 
 
191 
Service contracts should include a specific paragraph on spare parts. OEM contracts usually 
lack the inclusion of them or any specification of the condition (e.g. new, refurbished) of 
parts used for maintenance and repair (Gaev, 2010b). It should be the duty of clinical 
engineers to assess the need for spare parts and include them in the contract, in dedicated 
annexes. 
The economic assessment of service contracts is done using  the definition of financial 
performance indexes. The most common index  is the service cost/acquisition cost (S/A) 
ratio, i.e. the total cost to deliver a service, including parts and labor, divided by the 
acquisition cost of the equipment. Services delivered by OEMs (or third-party service 
suppliers) under a full-service contract usually include IPM and repair. The cost of same 
service delivered by an in-house CED is computed from the amount spent on parts and CED 
labor (labor hours) multiplied by the “loaded” rate including salary, benefits and other over-
head expenses. In-house service is generally less expensive (50 percent less) than full-service 
OEM contract, even if this estimation varies significantly according to the equipment 
category. A recent ECRI review shows that imaging and high-tech laboratory equipment has 
a higher S/A ratio and is thus more costly to maintain than general biomedical equipment, 
even if this ratio may vary greatly due to institutional (e.g., teaching vs non teaching 
institution), logistics (e.g., urban vs rural hospital) as well as operational (e.g., low vs high 
negotiated acquisition price) differences (Gaev, 2010a). 
Particular consideration should be given to the drawing-up of penalty clauses for the 
possibility of non-compliant service, the latter defined in terms of technical response time 
and equipment uptime/downtime. Moreover, competitive benchmarking for service 
contracts should also take into account fees for service outside of contract work hours, and 
any minimum charges required for travel time, service time, and work performed outside of 
the usual contract provisions. However,  to make effective the use of penalty clauses,  
essential tools have to be set in place such as the computerized management of processes, 
implementation of a contact center (phone or online) for maintenance requests, systematic 
review of the quality of maintenance activities, failure analyses,  and strict control of 
performance indicators and maintenance costs. 
6. Issues in information technology and Clinical Engineering Department 
(CED) activities 
Any action undertaken to improve the management/control of medical devices in a 
healthcare facility through an efficient and effective organization of maintenance and 
technology assessment activities, requires the implementation of operating procedures that 
enable the standardization of CED processes. However, the rapid evolution of health 
technologies during the last decades and the spread of heterogeneous technologies, besides 
bringing undeniable clinical improvements, have resulted in a considerable increase in 
technology investments, with the subsequent need for tools that can aid decision making in 
acquiring new technologies and managing the existing ones. To achieve the double goal of 
correctly applying and automating procedures and of implementing a model for the 
appropriate management of available resources and the proper definition of priorities, a 
comprehensive and reliable dataset for health technologies as well as an appropriate 
software tool to support data management will be required.  Electronic archives are thus 
essential for storing all data and all events in the life of the medical devices managed by the 
CED, from the technology assessment that should always precede their acquisition until 
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their disposal. Such a tool will permit safer documentation and reporting of the maintenance 
and management activities, sharing of information between the CED and other hospital 
staff, a dramatic improvement in data search, provision of summary statistics, and the 
definition of indicators that may contribute to the proper management of health 
technologies. The organization of this database may vary markedly depending on 
heterogeneous factors such as healthcare facility organization, technical and administrative 
management policies, number of devices, and resources dedicated to data management. The 
opportunity to support and significantly improve the management of medical equipment 
makes it advisable to implement a solution that can be configured and easily updated 
according to the evolution of specific needs. The configurable features of the system should 
include database design, user interfaces, queries, reports and statistics. The possibility to 
configure the database is useful not only for adding tables and fields, but also for the 
development of new features and adaptation of the software to the organizational structure 
of the healthcare facility. Configurable user interfaces should include at least the appropriate 
forms for inventory, acceptance testing, safety and performance tests, maintenance 
processes, preventive maintenance plan, maintenance contracts, disposal of devices, and 
administrative data management. Customizable configurations for different users should be 
guaranteed, in order to adapt the software according to the role and responsibilities of each 
user, with different data visualization and operating permissions. System users should be 
allowed to extract and export data in convenient formats (e.g., spreadsheets) for offline 
processing. Templates for standard documents (e.g. acceptance testing reports, maintenance 
reports) must be available and it should be easy to obtain automatically filled in and ready-
to-print documents. It should be possible to analyze data with a configurable statistics 
dashboard. Such a system architecture would be suitable for developing methods for health 
technologies management and for defining indicators for the implementation of a 
technology replacement plan, the identification of maintenance priorities, and the 
optimization of resources allocation. Ultimately, being able to customize the software makes 
it possible to update the structure and configuration of the system according to the 
organization and evolution of operational requirements specific to a particular healthcare 
facility, and also makes it a suitable tool to support the development of processes. This 
feature is also particularly relevant for the purpose of satisfying the requirements for 
certification and the standards for national and international accreditation. The 
configuration should be performed or at least supervised by the CED staff, who best know 
the specific needs of the organizational context in which the software is to be used. Another 
advisable solution is to adopt systems that are accessible via the facility’s intranet. Web-
based systems that do not require any client-side software installation are useful for sharing 
information between the different actors involved and can improve the automation of 
processes for Health Technology Management (HTM). Moreover, with web-based systems it 
is possible for health operators to access many support features for the management of 
technologies. They can submit online requests for corrective maintenance, monitor the real-
time evolution of submitted requests, search the database for devices, preventive 
maintenance plan or safety tests, and receive automatic e-mail notifications when certain 
events occur (e.g. , maintenance processes closed by biomed technicians, reminders for 
scheduled maintenance). This approach also has the advantage that only one data entry is 
needed (e.g., biomed technicians no longer have to re-enter data that have already been 
entered by the health operators on the maintenance request form). Obviously, all users 
should be trained in at least the basic principles of the system. The use of such a system for 
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the management of medical devices can be extended to (or integrated with) the management 
of other technological facilities, ICT equipment,  and other hospital assets.  
6.1 Management of the acquisition process 
A number of advantages for budget management can be gained by using computerized 
procedures for online submission of requests from heads of hospital units for the acquisition 
of new medical devices. Specification of medical device type according to a standard 
nomenclature system could be required, which would avoid the use of disparate terms for 
the same equipment. Also, the use of required fields in the electronic request form (e.g., 
reason for the acquisition, expected benefits, consumables needed) would ensure that all 
requests contain the essential information for their proper assessment. The medical board, 
with the support of the CED, would then have the right tools to manage the submitted 
requests in a uniform manner and make an objective analysis. assign a priority ranking to 
each request, and finally  decide which ones to approve and which to reject. This approach 
could also be useful for the activation of hospital-based HTA (HB-HTA) processes (see par. 
2). Furthermore, the authorization process (i.e., approval by department directors and 
medical board or medical devices committee) can be automated and differentiated 
according to the type of acquisition (e.g. property,  loan,  service, rental, clinical trial). 
Approval of the request will be automatically notified and immediately available online. 
The technology renewal plan managed by the CED may be integrated and partially 
automated in the software by implementing an algorithm for calculating the replacement 
priority value (see par. 4). Following the approval of requests for new acquisitions and 
replacement of medical devices, the automation of CED processes would provide valuable 
support for the management of data and documents relating to the assessment and 
acquisition of technologies. Information concerning single budget items (e.g., type of 
acquisition, number of requested devices, allocated budget) and on acquisition progress (i.e., 
end of the market survey, drafting and issuance of the technical assessment, date of order by 
the administration, supplier name) can be shared between the CED and the healthcare 
facility administration, with automatic update of acquisition progress and online availability 
of documents for each budget item. At all stages, starting from submission of the requests, 
only a single data entry is needed.  
6.2 Acceptance testing and inventory management 
In a computerized system for managing CED’s processes, each medical device has its own 
inventory record containing the data relevant to its management (e.g., device model, 
accessories, system configuration, owner hospital unit, location, administrative data). Each 
device in the inventory must be uniquely identified, and the CED must place an identifying 
label on it. As stated above, the adoption of a standard medical device nomenclature for 
model identification is also strongly recommended. If a web-based system is used, health 
operators will be able to search for inventory records and obtain lists of devices that can be 
exported onto spreadsheets. For each device in the inventory, the acceptance testing must be 
registered in the system. The status of the device can be updated automatically and an e-
mail notification sent upon completion of testing.. In order to keep the inventory data up-to-
date, in addition to routine administrative tasks, periodic inventory checks must also be 
made. In this regard, mobile units (e.g., PDA) equipped with a tag (e.g. barcode, RFiD) 
reader, properly configured and synchronized with the CED software system, can be a 
useful tool. This approach allows easier tracking of devices and verification of equipment 
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location and condition, as well as updating of system components. Another useful feature is 
the online availability of documents. These could include pre-acquisition documents (e.g., 
market survey, technical assessment, order form), user and service manuals, acceptance 
testing documents and training course forms, as well as pictures of system configurations 
and accessories. 
6.3 Maintenance processes 
Maintenance processes management could exploit the availability of an appropriate 
software tool. As stated above, a useful feature is the possibility for health operators, in case 
of failure of a medical device, to request corrective maintenance online. Maintenance 
activities should then be recorded in the system by CED biomed technicians. CED can enter 
and update the maintenance plan (i.e., the preventive maintenance activities for which both 
internal technicians and external maintenance personnel will be appointed) and share it, as 
well as related information (e.g. maintenance progress, e-mail notification of upcoming 
preventive maintenance), with all hospital units involved. Health operators should be 
allowed to retrieve and export lists of maintenance requests. Thousands of safety and 
performance tests are performed on medical devices each year by the CED. Thus the 
availability of test reports to health operators is only possible by implementing an automatic 
upload system. Radiology equipment deserves a particular mention in that it is usually 
managed by both CED and the  Medical Physics Unit. This requires sharing of information 
on preventive and corrective maintenance and quality controls. Finally, the software tool 
can also be used to facilitate the management of spare parts.  Online access to maintenance 
documents (i.e., preventive and corrective maintenance activities, safety and performance 
test reports, administrative documents) is another desirable feature. The availability of such 
electronic information enables the CED to analyze the history of maintenance processes for 
each device, to improve monitoring of maintenance activities performed both by CED 
technicians and by external maintenance personnel, to verify the compliance of suppliers 
with maintenance contracts, to gather downtime statistics, and to generate summaries of 
maintenance costs. Finally, algorithms can be defined and implemented to combine device 
replacement priority value (see par. 4) and maintenance priority rank for immediate 
identification of the most urgent corrective actions. Automated information sharing can also 
be helpful for the disposal of devices. The way this feature can be configured depends on 
the specific organization. For example, CED could be in charge of notifying the hospital unit 
of device disposal, while the physical removal of the device would be the responsibility of 
the facility handling service. An automatic e-mail notification of disposal confirmation to the 
CED would allow an easier tracking of out of order devices, thus reducing inconvenience 
and risk for patients and health operators.  
7. References 
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management. (2002). Strategies and tips for 
maximizing failure mode and effect analysis in an organization. J Healthc Risk 
Manag , 22(3), 9-12. 
Anderson, F. A. (1990). Medical Device Risk Assessment. In The Medical Device Industry: 
Science, Technology, and Regulation in a Competitive Environment (p. 487-493). Marcel 
Dekker Ltd. 
www.intechopen.com
 Clinical Engineering 
 
195 
AS/NZS 4360:2004. Risk Management Standard.  
Battista, R. (2006). Expanding the scientific basis of health technology assessment: a research 
agenda for the next decade. Int J Technol Assess Health Care , 22(3), 275-80. 
Brueley, M. (1989). Ergonomics and errors: who is responsible? Proceedings of the first 
symposium on Human Factors in medical device, (p. 6-10). 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute. (2006). CPSI, Canadian Root Cause Analysis framework: a tool 
for identifying and addressing the root causes of critical incidents in healthcare.  
CEI EN 60601-1 (n.d.). Medical electrical equipment, Part 1: General requirements for basic 
safety and essential performance. 
Cheng, M.; Dyro, J.F. (2004). Good Management Practice for Medical Equipment, In: Clinical 
Engineering Handbook, J. F. Dyro, (Ed.), 108-110, Academic Press Inc., ISBN 978-0-12-
226570-9, Burlington, Massachusetts,  USA 
Cox, L. J. (2008). What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices? Risk Analysis , 28 (2), 497-512. 
De Vivo, L.; Derrico, P.; Tomaiuolo, D.; Capussotto, C. ; Reali, A.  (2004). Evaluating 
alternative service contracts for medical equipment, Proceedings of IEEE EMBS 2004 
26th Annual International Conference, pp. 3485-3488, IBSN 0-7803-8439-3, San 
Francisco, California, USA, September 1-5, 2004 
Dillon, B. (2000). Medical Device Reliability and associated areas. CRC Press. 
Draborg, E., Gyrd-Hansen, D., Poulsen, P. B., & Horder, M. (2005). International comparison 
of the definition and the practical application of health technology assessment. Int J 
Technol Assess Health Care , 21(1), 89-95. 
EUNEHTA. (n.d.). Work Package 4: HTA Core Model for Diagnostic Technologies. Avaliable 
from www.eunethta.net. 
European Directive 2007/47/EC. 
FDA. (1997). Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers.  
FDA. (2000). Guidance for Industry and FDA Premarket and Design Control Reviewers - Medical 
Device Use-Safety: Incorporating Human Factors Engineering into Risk Management.  
Fennigkoh - A Medical Equipment Replacement Model. Journal of Clinical Engineering. 
17(1):43-47, January/February 1992 
Gaev, J.A. (2010). Benchmarking Service Contracts, In: TechNation, June 2010, Available from 
https://www.ecri.org/ 
Gaev, J.A. (2010).Successful Measure: benchmarking clinical engineering performance, In: 
Health Facilities Management, February 2010, Available from  
 https://www.ecri.org/ 
Garrido, V. M., Kristensen, F., Palmhøj Niel, C., & Busse, R. (2008). Health technology 
assessment and health policy-making in Europe. Current status, challenges and potential. 
Available from www.euro.who.int. 
Goodman, C. (2004). Introduction to Health Technology Assessment, HTA 101.  
INAHTA. (n.d.). Glossary. Available from www.inahta.org . 
ISO 14971:2007. Medical devices - Application of risk management to medical devices.  
ISO 31000:2009. Risk management - Principles and guidelines.  
Italian Ministry of Health - Recommendation for the Prevention of Adverse Events 
Consequent to the Malfunctioning of Medical Devices/Electrical Equipment - 
Recommendation #9 April 2009 
Mccaffrey, J., & Hagg-Rickert, S. (2010). Development of a Risk Management Program. In A. 
S. (ASHRM), Risk Management Handbook for Health Care Organizations.  
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Biomedical Engineering 
 
196 
Ruge, B. (2004). Risk Matrix as Tool for Risk Assessment in the Chemical Process Industries. 
ESREL 2004, (p. paper 0192). 
Samore, M. H., Evans, R., Lassen, A., Gould, P., Lloyd, J., Gardner, R., et al. (2004). Journal of 
the American Medical Association. Surveillance of medical device–related hazards and 
adverse events in hospitalized patients, JAMA. 2004;291(3): , 325-334. 
Subhan, A. (2006). Equipment Maintenance, Biomedical. In: Encyclopedia of Medical Devices 
and Instrumentation, J.G.Webster, 289-321, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NJ USA 
Taylor-Adams, S., Vincent, C.,  Stanhope, N. (1999). Applying human factors methods to the 
investigation and analysis of clinical adverse events. Safety Science , 31, 143-159. 
Velasco, M., Perleth, M., Drummond, M., Gürtner, F., Jørgensen, T., Jovell, A. (2002). Best 
practice in undertaking and reporting health technology assessments. Int J Technol 
Assess Health Care , 18(2), 361-422. 
Wilkins, R., & Holley, L. (1998). Risk management in medical equipment management. 
Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in 
Medicine and Biology Society. 6, p. 3343-3345., Hong Kong Sar, China, October 1998 
www.intechopen.com
Applied Biomedical Engineering
Edited by Dr. Gaetano Gargiulo
ISBN 978-953-307-256-2
Hard cover, 500 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 23, August, 2011
Published in print edition August, 2011
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
This book presents a collection of recent and extended academic works in selected topics of biomedical
technology, biomedical instrumentations, biomedical signal processing and bio-imaging. This wide range of
topics provide a valuable update to researchers in the multidisciplinary area of biomedical engineering and an
interesting introduction for engineers new to the area. The techniques covered include modelling,
experimentation and discussion with the application areas ranging from bio-sensors development to
neurophysiology, telemedicine and biomedical signal classification.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Pietro Derrico, Matteo Ritrovato, Federico Nocchi, Francesco Faggiano, Carlo Capussotto, Tiziana Franchin
and Liliana De Vivo (2011). Clinical Engineering, Applied Biomedical Engineering, Dr. Gaetano Gargiulo (Ed.),
ISBN: 978-953-307-256-2, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/applied-biomedical-
engineering/clinical-engineering
© 2011 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
